# UN: Threat of a hacking attack on nuclear plants is growing



## RedLion (Sep 23, 2015)

Even though I see the UN as a group of thugs serving their globalist masters, this would make sense as a serious threat.

News from The Associated Press


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## SOCOM42 (Nov 9, 2012)

RedLion said:


> Even though I see the UN as a group of thugs serving their globalist masters, this would make sense as a serious threat.
> 
> [url=http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/UN_UNITED_NATIONS_EXTREMISTS_AND_DEADLY_WEAPONS?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2016
> 
> ...


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## Boss Dog (Feb 8, 2013)

why do nuclear plants need to be hooked up to the internet anyway? Keep it all local, hard wired, no net, problem solved.


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## Prepared One (Nov 5, 2014)

This type of threat is just a matter of time. Not if, but when. Don't think for a second the " Non State Nefarious Actors " ( Terrorists ) are not pursuing this type of scenario on several different fronts.


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## Targetshooter (Dec 4, 2015)

The UN is only doing this to cover there azz.


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## sideKahr (Oct 15, 2014)

Boss Dog said:


> why do nuclear plants need to be hooked up to the internet anyway? Keep it all local, hard wired, no net, problem solved.


I agree 100%. The consequences of lax security is just too high. Get tough. NO portable computers or thumb drives allowed through the main gates. All input/output devices to the OS to be in locked cages, on the buddy system, and alarmed. NO USB sockets on any equipment, anywhere. NO bluetooth.


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## SOCOM42 (Nov 9, 2012)

The reason they are tied to the interweb is for overall control of the grid's distribution and plant generation levels.

That opens them up to hacking without a question.

They could do what many police and government agencies do, have what is know as a closed loop.

I worked for years with one called CJIS, the data was encrypted.

With the closed loop, there is no physical way to gain entry from the outside.

Only a traitor operating on the inside could do harm.

But that would cost a lot and they don't want to spend the money.


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## sideKahr (Oct 15, 2014)

SOCOM42 said:


> The reason they are tied to the interweb is for overall control of the grid's distribution and plant generation levels.
> 
> That opens them up to hacking without a questio...


You're right. Can't they have a firewall between the reactor and generation subsystems? If hackers manage to trip a turbine, the worst that could happen would be a SCRAM.


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## AnotherSOFSurvivor (Sep 7, 2016)

Connection to the "wide web" is needed for Disaster Recovery Protocols, data backups, control of distribution systems, remote intervention and systems monitoring; this is done with as much security as can be mustered - using HTTPS/SSL, Secret Keys for getting onto sub-systems, (hopefully) Salt and Pepper along with SHA-1 hashes, done through VPNs, and I really hope they do not allow VDI/BYOD

However, even with all of those NETSEC interventions and countermeasures, they are STILL connected to the outside world, there is still a help desk/data center that supports the DoE (Energy, not Edu) as well as whatever State-level organization they fall under - the weakest part of every system is the humans, sure you can (slowly) defeat mitigation attempts such as HTTPS/SSL connections, you can brute-force and rainbow table hashes, you can attempt MITM/CSS attacks on the antiquated web apps/mainframe apps that these systems are utilizing...but there is still a help desk/support center, and there are gov't employed weanies there who can be social engineered

As far as firewalls go, there are many flavors and implementation types - either your good ole built in Firewall, Web Firewalls, Physical Firewalls, IP filtering via Blacklist/Whitelist/Graylist...the best possible better is having a PHYSICAL WAF as far forward as you can - and implement a white list - you ONLY allow connections from approved IPs, however I am sure those are VPN end-points, and doing work with DOS/DOD/DOE - they don't really change up their VPN stuff, they go to the same few vendors, who also sell to the civ/PS market...however, I have never seen a whitelist properly implemented, either ITGOV or some other dumbass auditing organization or Director/VP of Infra/Sec wants to have a blacklist instead because they HAVE to get onto the Intranet...

Now even if you only did a Black/Gray list on the first-layer WAF, you still need more WAFs behind it - the credentials should be done with a in-house PKI that is encrypted and stored on a physical server within the compound, and have that puppy behind a physical DBFW, and an ACTUAL white list - only certain IPs with tokens should be requesting the private key for access, again, I do not see that a whole lot

And then there needs to be a last WAF after you get the key, which should ALSO have a damn white-list...however, due to SLAs at the higher gov (IT Governance, not Uncle Sam - even they are sometimes the same), all of that redirection and security slows down your throughput - a lot - so sometimes security is sacrificed, or not as bolstered, as it should really be

Either way - most NETSEC boxes (Kali, Backtrack, C/A) come with tools that attack known exploits of these systems - doesn't matter if its General Dynamics, Cisco, Parvus, Barracuda or otherwise - between bounty programs, the NSA toolset that go leaked (actually very good stuff, albeit a little dated), and dedicated workarounds that are publicized, it is more about smart implementation of secure networks, encryption where necessary, hashing where available, proper usage of white-lists, no stupid ass BYOD/VDI/DaaS formats, and hopefully they have some sort of CAC/PIV blockage on white-listed devices

In my experience as I mentioned, I haven't seen that implemented...at all...not even at the highest levels when I was with TFs under JSOC - and I am not a master of information security, but best practices get sacrificed all too much

This is serious, and it should be worried about

**Also - if I jacked up some terminology/methodologies let me know, God knows I haven't stayed as sharp on INFOSEC since I moved into the PMO arena**


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## Sasquatch (Dec 12, 2014)

Isn't the timing of this story just a little too convenient? I mean with the left trying to convince everyone Russia hacked the election. Not saying it's not possible but the story seems like good timing to be used as propaganda. 

Sent from a Galaxy S5 far far away.


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## SOCOM42 (Nov 9, 2012)

sideKahr said:


> You're right. Can't they have a firewall between the reactor and generation subsystems? If hackers manage to trip a turbine, the worst that could happen would be a SCRAM.


Yes, they can, but I think some foreign state will manage to breach it.

In my limited knowledge, shutting down a reactor is not the problem,

taking out high line x-formers causing the entire grid to automatically shut down to protect itself is.

Another is to force a generator to stay online forcing it to overload if the breaker are computer controlled and not thermal.

The problem is not limited to nuclear but conventionally fired plants also.

The key to kill the grid is to destroy the primary x-formers causing the grid to drop.

There are no replacement ones available, 6 months or longer to build them.

A good way to take down the grid here in the northeast is to physically drop the long lines coming out of Québec Hydro in the middle of nowhere.

Twenty men, with the right equipment working in pairs, making a coordinated attack, could do enough damage to keep the grid down for years.


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## Medic33 (Mar 29, 2015)

while it should be taken seriously as if the thread happened -in all means. IMO it is hogwash.


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## TG (Jul 28, 2014)

At this point, even if you have an earthquake or a hurricane, your Democrats will find a way to blame Russians... they have high expectations of our impressive hacking abilities.


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## sideKahr (Oct 15, 2014)

@SOCOM42 You bring up an interesting point. Why go to all the trouble of hacking a system, when a few sticks of 40% can do the job. You scare me, man.
@AnotherSOFSurvivor I didn't understand enough of what you said to know whether I should crap or wind my watch. But if you're worried, then I'm worried.


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## paraquack (Mar 1, 2013)

Nuke plants need power to keep the cooling pumps running. With Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, 
they had no power except short term battery system (8 hrs) to cool the reactor when is scramed from 
the disconnection from the grid. No grid, no generators, dead batteries, BOOM. The US hasn't learned 
a thing from their disaster. I guess we'll just have to wait for our own!


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## bigwheel (Sep 22, 2014)

RedLion said:


> Even though I see the UN as a group of thugs serving their globalist masters, this would make sense as a serious threat.
> 
> News from The Associated Press


Right right. Thanks. If them pesky Ruskies can hack the Hildebeast out of the White House..They prob got some other more destructive and exotic hacks in mind.


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## TG (Jul 28, 2014)

bigwheel said:


> Right right. Thanks. If them pesky Ruskies can hack the Hildebeast out of the White House..They prob got some other more destructive and exotic hacks in mind.


hahaha


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## Slippy (Nov 14, 2013)

For the record, I think the UN is an evil anti-American entity and the USA needs to exit the UN then immediately show the UN the exit door from the USA.


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## SOCOM42 (Nov 9, 2012)

sideKahr said:


> @SOCOM42 You bring up an interesting point. Why go to all the trouble of hacking a system, when a few sticks of 40% can do the job. You scare me, man.
> 
> @AnotherSOFSurvivor I didn't understand enough of what you said to know whether I should crap or wind my watch. But if you're worried, then I'm worried.


As I have said before they are not going to concentrate on nuke plants, too secure.

As far as 40% goes, unless tamped, 60% is better.

The x-former housings are made of pretty thick mild steel, but not armor plate.

Myself, I would use LSC's, much better results.

Think of a coal fired plant getting stoked with a half ton of AUNT JEMIMA.


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## AnotherSOFSurvivor (Sep 7, 2016)

SOCOM42 said:


> As I have said before they are not going to concentrate on nuke plants, too secure.
> 
> As far as 40% goes, unless tamped, 60% is better.
> 
> ...


Hell, remember that "attack" on the California elec plant a year or 2 ago? Few guys shot AKs at coolant tanks and the xformers crapped out and knocked out a ton of power

Even rudimentary FAE fertilizer based explosive device would do a number on a waystation or an array

sent from a paper cup and string via quantum wierdness


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## bigwheel (Sep 22, 2014)

AnotherSOFSurvivor said:


> Hell, remember that "attack" on the California elec plant a year or 2 ago? Few guys shot AKs at coolant tanks and the xformers crapped out and knocked out a ton of power
> 
> Even rudimentary FAE fertilizer based explosive device would do a number on a waystation or an array
> 
> sent from a paper cup and string via quantum wierdness


Remember it well..thanks for the reminder. All it would take is knowing where to aim the old Winni.


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## SOCOM42 (Nov 9, 2012)

AnotherSOFSurvivor said:


> Hell, remember that "attack" on the California elec plant a year or 2 ago? Few guys shot AKs at coolant tanks and the xformers crapped out and knocked out a ton of power
> 
> Even rudimentary FAE fertilizer based explosive device would do a number on a waystation or an array
> 
> sent from a paper cup and string via quantum wierdness


Oh yes, I do.

Probably the same group took out the underground electric and FOC lines also.

I was in many briefings related what if's as far as power distribution, generation and underground gas and petro product pipelines go.

Far too easy to disrupt any of them, not something a lone wolf would do, but an organized group with the needed intellect.


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## AnotherSOFSurvivor (Sep 7, 2016)

SOCOM42 said:


> Oh yes, I do.
> 
> Probably the same group took out the underground electric and FOC lines also.
> 
> ...


My old man says the same thing, he was Delta in the late 80s/early 90s and told stories how they would purposely drill 2-3 man strikes and raids, idea was that the Russian SOF would do the same to strike targets fast

place 10 teams of 2-3 guys with some distributed knowledge and good communication and they could do anything the want.

From an INFOSEC standpoint dept of energy and similar orgs suck, a cyber attack wouldnt be hard...would be much easier to roll over some patrols and thermite/det out infrastructure weak points

sent from a paper cup and string via quantum wierdness


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## SOCOM42 (Nov 9, 2012)

Read my post 11, 20 men, 2 man teams, coordinated op.


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## Boss Dog (Feb 8, 2013)

sideKahr said:


> I agree 100%. The consequences of lax security is just too high. Get tough. NO portable computers or thumb drives allowed through the main gates. All input/output devices to the OS to be in locked cages, on the buddy system, and alarmed. NO USB sockets on any equipment, anywhere. NO bluetooth.


Many gov't agencies employ most of these measures already, more should.


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## bigwheel (Sep 22, 2014)

Bury the dead terrorists with a strip of bacon around the neck. Publicize it well. This nonsense could be over with day after tomorrow.


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